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Abstract—Location Privacy-Preserving Mechanisms (LPPMs)
in the literature largely consider that users’ data available for
training wholly characterizes their mobility patterns. Thus, they
hardwire this information in their designs and evaluate their
privacy properties with these same data. In this paper, we aim
to understand the impact of this decision on the level of privacy
these LPPMs may offer in real life when the users’ mobility data
may be different from the data used in the design phase. Our
results show that, in many cases, training data does not capture
users’ behavior accurately and, thus, the level of privacy provided
by the LPPM is often overestimated. To address this gap between
theory and practice, we propose to use blank-slate models for
LPPM design. Contrary to the hardwired approach, that assumes
known users’ behavior, blank-slate models learn the users’
behavior from the queries to the service provider. We leverage
this blank-slate approach to develop a new family of LPPMs,
that we call Profile Estimation-Based LPPMs. Using real data, we
empirically show that our proposal outperforms optimal state-of-
the-art mechanisms designed on sporadic hardwired models. On
non-sporadic location privacy scenarios, our method is only better
if the usage of the location privacy service is not continuous.
It is our hope that eliminating the need to bootstrap the
mechanisms with training data and ensuring that the mechanisms
are lightweight and easy to compute help fostering the integration
of location privacy protections in deployed systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, the research community has progressed
significantly in the theoretical study and development of
Location Privacy-Preserving Mechanisms (LPPMs) [1]–[4],
including a number of optimal defense proposals [2]–[9]. In
practice, however, there are few LPPMs deployed, and the
most popular ones are not effective at protecting the users’
privacy, since they either build countermeasures that only
protect against naive trilateration attacks [10] or implement
algorithms [11] that are known to be suboptimal [8], [12]. A
potential reason for the lack of adoption and deployment of
the new and effective LPPMs proposed by academia is that
they require mobility traces in order to bootstrap their design.
In practice, gathering mobility data that is sufficient, up-to-
date, and truly representative of a particular user’s behavior is
complicated. In most cases, user behavior is to some degree
unknown, and it is not clear how the latest LPPMs perform
when built upon data that does not completely describe the
user’s mobility behavior.
Chatzikokolakis et al. [8] already claim that a fair assess-
ment of LPPMs requires the separation between the train-
ing dataset used for design, and the testing dataset used
for evaluation. Yet, their design strategy, as the rest of the
previous works, hardwires the training mobility model into
the mechanism and they do not quantify how much privacy is
lost in practice when the users’ mobility characteristics differs
from the training data.
In this work, we aim at understanding the privacy loss
associated to this discrepancy between design and deployment
phases. We study both sporadic cases, where users occasion-
ally query the Location Based Service (LBS) and thus every
time their location is independent from previous LBS uses; and
continuous cases, where users’ actual location at a certain time
depends on previously visited locations. We find that, since
the design strategies in previous works hardwire the training
information on the LPPMs they produce, they cannot adapt
to behavioral patterns not available in the training data. We
empirically show that, indeed, previous analyses overestimate
the protection of the optimal LPPMs when they are evaluated
on mobility profiles different from the training data.
In response to this problem, we introduce a new design
strategy that builds on what we call blank-slate models for user
mobility. Contrary to hardwired models, blank-slate models
do not fix their parameters based on training data, but learn
these parameters as they observe the user behavior. We take
the particular case of sporadic location privacy and leverage
a blank-slate model to build a new family of defenses that
we call Profile Estimation-Based LPPMs (PEB-LPPMs). Like
traditional LPPMs, these mechanisms are initialized with
training data. However, as the user queries the LBS, they
adapt their parameters. Thus, they are more adequate for those
users whose behavior is not well-represented in the training
data. We empirically compare PEB-LPPMs with state-of-the-
art LPPMs using real data. Our evaluation confirms that PEB-
LPPMs are more effective than traditional hardwired models
when the testing data cannot be fully characterized a-priori by
the training data.
To summarize, our contributions are:
• We empirically show that hardwiring the characteristics of a
dataset into Location Privacy Preserving Mechanisms [1]–[9],
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[13] yields mechanisms that do not adequately protect users
whose behavior deviates from that observed in training.
• We propose blank-slate models for user mobility in location
privacy. Contrary to hardwired models, these models treat
the user mobility as an unknown variable that is learned a-
posteriori as the user queries the LBS. Therefore, they enable
the design of LPPMs that are effective when the user behavior
changes with respect to the one observed when designing the
mechanism.
• We leverage a blank-slate sporadic mobility model to de-
velop a new LPPM design technique, that we call Profile
Estimation-Based (PEB). PEB-LPPMs adapt to the user behav-
ior by performing a Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE)
of the mobility profile given past observations, and are suitable
for both sporadic and non-sporadic location protection.
• We compare PEB-LPPMs with optimal state-of-the-art de-
signs developed using hardwired sporadic and Markov models.
PEB-LPPMs always outperform optimal sporadic hardwired
LPPMs, and sometimes they even outperform optimal LPPMs
based on Markov models if the training data does not correctly
capture the mobility behavior of the users of the testing set.
• To carry out this comparison we extend efficient remapping
techniques used in optimal sporadic LPPMs [8] to build
optimal non-sporadic Markov-based LPPMs [7], [13]. This
considerably reduces the computational cost of building non-
sporadic LPPMs and allows us to evaluate them empirically.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sect. II we introduce
our system model and notation, as well as the evaluation
framework that we use in the paper. Section III presents the
sporadic and Markov mobility models. Then, in Sect. IV,
we explain how previous works use these mobility models,
hardwired on training data, to build optimal LPPMs. We
train and evaluate these optimal LPPMs with real data in
Sect. V, showing that there is a gap between their theoretical
performance and their actual performance in the testing set.
We introduce blank-slate models and our technique to develop
PEB-LPPMs in Sect. VI, and evaluate it in Section VII.
Finally, Sect. VIII summarizes related work and Sect. IX
concludes.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE LOCATION PRIVACY PROBLEM
In this section, we first provide an abstraction of the location
privacy problem and introduce our notation. Then, we present
our framework for design and evaluation of LPPMs.
A. Problem Statement and Notation
As in previous works [1], [5], [8], [9], we consider the
scenario where an individual, the user, sends queries to an
LBS provider and receives responses with the information she
desires. We assume that there is a passive adversary observing
the locations inside the user queries, who can be either an
honest-but-curious LBS or an eavesdropper. The adversary’s
goal is to infer private information from the locations in user
queries [14], [15]. To protect herself, the user obfuscates her
locations using an LPPM, and sends these fake locations in
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Fig. 1: Abstraction of the location privacy problem.
the queries. By doing so, the user trades in quality of service
for privacy.
We illustrate the location privacy problem in Fig. 1. We
use ρ to denote the total number of queries sent by the user
to the LBS, and refer to each query by its query number
r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ρ}. We use xr ∈ X to denote the real location
associated with the r-th query, i.e., the location the user wants
to query about. We use x .= [x1, . . . , xρ] ∈ X ρ to denote the
vector of all the real locations, and xr .= [x1, . . . , xr] ∈ X r
to denote the vector of all the real locations up to query
number r. Likewise, we use zr ∈ Z to denote the r-th fake
location reported and define the vectors z and zr. The real
and fake locations are also called input and output locations
respectively. Finally, we use xˆr ∈ Xˆ to denote the adversary’s
estimation of xr.
In this work, we assume that X , Z and Xˆ are discrete sets
of locations (i.e., the users can only report locations in a grid).
We do this for computational simplicity and for compatibility
with previous proposals [5], [7], [13]. However, all of our
findings can be extended to other scenarios (e.g., Z = R2 is
the plane [9], Z is a discrete set of cloaking regions [16], or a
powerset of points of interest [6]). We use x1, x2, . . . , x|X | to
denote each of the discrete locations in X . Finally, we use p
generally to denote the probability mass function of a discrete
random variable, or the probability density function when the
variable is continuous. E{·} denotes the expectation.
Now, we explain how real, obfuscated, and estimated loca-
tions are generated. The real locations x are chosen by the user
as she queries the LBS. In some scenarios, the user makes a
sporadic usage of the LBS (e.g., location check-in, location-
tagging, or applications for finding nearby points-of-interest or
friends). This means that the real locations of two queries (e.g.,
xr and xs, with r 6= s) are not temporally dependent. In other
scenarios, however, the location of the user in consecutive
check-ins is correlated (e.g., a user that reports her location
frequently, such as running apps or WhatsApp’s live location
sharing).
In order to generate obfuscated locations z from the real
locations x the user employs an LPPM f . We study the
online location privacy setting, in which the user expects to
get the service from the LBS right away. In this case, the
LPPM is modeled as a probabilistic function that maps a real
location xr ∈ X , and possibly other information available to
the user up to that point (i.e., xr−1 and zr−1), to a value
zr ∈ Z . We use f to denote the probability density function
that characterizes the LPPM. Hence, we can write p(z|x) as
p(z|x) =
ρ∏
r=1
p(zr|zr−1,x) =
ρ∏
r=1
f(zr|zr−1,xr) . (1)
where the first equality is the chain rule of probability and
the second equality reflects the online setting assumption, i.e.,
the user generates zr given xr and zr−1, but independently
of future locations xr+1, xr+2, etc. We also refer to f as the
obfuscation mechanism.
Finally, the adversary generates the estimated locations
using an attack h. We assume that the adversary knows the
obfuscation mechanism f and she uses it to design her attack
h. We treat h as a deterministic function that takes a vector
of obfuscated locations zr and produces an estimate xˆs of a
(possibly past) real location xs (s ≤ r). We use xˆs(zr) to
denote the estimate produced from zr using h. We do not
consider randomized attacks, since the goal of the adversary
is to choose her estimation so as to minimize a specific privacy
metric, which can be achieved with deterministic attacks.
LPPM types: Depending on how much information they use
to generate obfuscated locations, LPPMs can offer stronger
privacy guarantees at the cost of introducing complexity in
the design. In this paper we study the following LPPM types
that can accommodate all previous proposals in the literature:
1) Full LPPMs are the most generic LPPM in the online
location privacy setting (see (1)), i.e., f(zr|zr−1,xr).
They generate each obfuscation location zr (perhaps
randomly) using all the information available to the user,
i.e., the previous and current input locations xr, and the
previously released obfuscated locations zr−1.
2) Output-based LPPMs, f(zr|zr−1, xr), generate the ob-
fuscated location using only the current real location xr
and all the previous obfuscated locations zr−1. These
are a sub-type of full LPPMs.
3) Memoryless LPPMs, f(zr|xr), generate each obfuscated
location using the current real location xr only. These
are a sub-type of output-based LPPMs.
We note that the framework in [1] considers LPPMs of the
full type in its theoretical setup, but the evaluation studies only
memoryless LPPMs. Memoryless LPPMs are used in sporadic
location privacy and works that consider a single location
release [3], [5], [6], [8], [9], [17]. Output-based LPPMs are
typically used in non-sporadic location privacy works [7], [13]
and, to the best of our knowledge, no optimal full-LPPM has
been proposed due to the computational complexity inherent
to its design.
The notation used in the paper is summarized in Table I.
B. Design and Evaluation Framework
We now describe a framework that instantiates the abstrac-
tion above. This framework extends ideas from [1], [8]. It
consists of two steps: the design step, where the user designs
TABLE I: Summary of notation
Symbol Meaning
ρ Total number of queries.
xr Real location of the user in the r-th query.
zr Obfuscated location of the user in the r-th query.
xr (or zr) Vector of real (or obfuscated) locations up to query r.
x (or z) Vector of all real (or obfuscated) locations.
X (or Z) Set of all possible real (or obfuscated) locations.
h Adversary’s attack.
xˆs(zr) Adversary’s estimate of the real location xs using zr .
f LPPM or obfuscation mechanism (pdf that generates zr).
f(zr|zr−1,xr) Full LPPM.
f(zr|zr−1, xr) Output-based LPPM.
f(zr|xr) Memoryless LPPM.
dQ(x
r, zr) Quality loss when reporting zr given xr .
Q(f, s) Average quality loss metric at query number r (2).
dP (x
r, xˆr) Adv. error when the adversary estimates xr as xˆr .
PAE(f, h, r, s) Avg. adv. error of xˆs given zr and attack h (5).
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Fig. 2: LPPM design and evaluation framework.
the LPPM f ; and the evaluation step, where the performance
of f is evaluated empirically. The framework is represented in
Fig. 2.
Design Step: In this step, the user studies the location privacy
problem and builds the LPPM f . We assume that the user
has access to a training set. She derives her design according
to some performance requirements, in terms of privacy and
utility metrics (e.g., maximizing privacy while keeping the
utility level above some bounds). Also, the user does not
know the adversary’s attack h, so she designs the LPPM
considering a worst case adversary. In order to compute the
privacy and utility metrics, the user needs a model for the
joint distribution p(x, z) = p(x) · p(z|x). The first term, p(x),
is the joint distribution of the real locations of the user. The
user derives this distribution by training her mobility model
with the training set information. The second term, p(z|x), is
determined by the LPPM f , as in (1).
Evaluation Step: In this step, the performance of f against
one or more attacks h is assessed empirically using a test-
ing set. Following Kerckhoffs principle, we assume that the
adversary knows the user LPPM, and uses an optimal attack,
i.e., an attack that minimizes the privacy metric. To develop the
worst-case attack we assume that the adversary knows mobility
statistics about the testing set (e.g., the actual probability
distribution that models x), a common assumption in related
works [1], [5], [7], [9].
The testing set contains real traces of locations x from a
location privacy dataset. The outputs z are probabilistically
generated using f and x. Then, the estimations xˆs (s =
1, 2, . . . ) are calculated using h and z. The privacy and utility
performance of the LPPM is assessed empirically based on x,
z and xˆs.
Note that there is a fundamental difference between the
design and the evaluation steps, regarding the treatment of the
real locations x. The design step is carried out by studying the
problem analytically, and this is done by assuming a particular
mobility model for the real locations p(x). The evaluation step,
on the contrary, is carried out empirically with real samples
of x. Ideally, the user wants her mobility model to closely
resemble her real behavior, so that her theoretical analyses
translate well into practice. However, finding a realistic model
for x is a very complicated task due to the unpredictability
and complexity of user behavior. Notice that this is not an
issue for the generation of z. This is because these samples
are generated by p(z|x), which is completely characterized by
the obfuscation mechanism and is the same in the design and
evaluation steps.
Main Differences with Previous Work: This framework
takes ideas from the literature, but also adds some contri-
butions. The framework by Shokri et al. [1] considers an
adversary that designs her attack based on the evaluation data,
but does not evaluate LPPMs designed to maximize privacy.
The separation between training and testing data is considered
for the first time in [8], but there is no quantification of
the privacy loss associated to users’ whose mobility profiles
diverge from the training data.
In this work, we integrate the training/testing separation as
part of the framework. We also consider the selection of a
model for the real locations p(x) as a crucial part of the
designing step, which was considered as given by previous
works [1]–[9], [13]. Finding a suitable theoretical model for
the user mobility p(x) and fitting it to the training data is part
of the LPPM design process. However, we cannot take for
granted that the actual locations of the user in practice x will
follow the theoretical model that she considered for design,
and thus the performance of the LPPM in practice might differ
from the theoretical performance.
C. Performance Metrics
We quantify the performance of LPPMs using privacy and
utility (or quality loss) metrics. In this work, we use the
average quality loss as utility metric, and the average adversary
error as privacy metric. These metrics are the most popular
in the user-centric location privacy literature [1]–[5], [7]–[9],
[13], [18]. We now define these metrics, and explain how
to compute them analytically given a model of p(x), and
empirically given samples of pairs (x, z).
Utility Metric: Average Quality Loss. The average quality
loss measures how much quality the user loses on average by
reporting obfuscated locations instead of real ones [2], [3], [5],
[7]–[9], [13], [18]. Let dQ(x, z) be a point-to-point distance
function that measures the loss incurred by revealing z when
the real location is x. The average loss at query r given LPPM
f is
Q(f, r) .= E{dQ(xr, zr)} , (2)
where the expectation is taken over realizations of xr and
zr. Given a distribution p(x), we can compute this metric
theoretically as
Q
theo
(f, r) =
∑
xr∈X
∑
zr∈Z
p(xr) · p(zr|xr) · dQ(xr, zr) , (3)
where p(xr) and p(zr|xr) can be obtained analytically from
p(x) and p(z|x).
Empirically, we can compute this metric by averaging the
distance between xr and zr over multiple simulations, i.e.,
Q
prac
(f, r) = Eemp{dQ(xr, zr)} , (4)
where Eemp{·} denotes the empirical mean.
The typical choice for the distance function dQ(·) is the
Euclidean distance. However, dQ(·) can be tailored to the
particular application where we want to provide location
privacy. For example, in an application to find nearby points of
interest within a city, the Manhattan distance is appropriate to
measure the walking distance to go from x to z. In that case,
Q would represent the average amount of extra meters that
the user has to walk to reach the desired point of interest. In
a ride-sharing app, however, dQ(x, z) can represent the extra
time or money that the user loses by reporting z instead of
her real location x. We can also use semantic metrics based
on the location tags of x and z, etc.
Privacy Metric: Average Adversary Error. The average
adversary error is defined as the mean error incurred by an
adversary that estimates the user real locations using an attack
h [1]–[5], [7]–[9], [13], [18]. Let dP (x, xˆ) be a function
that quantifies how much privacy the user has when her real
location is x and the location estimated by the adversary is xˆ.
Typically, dP (·) is the Euclidean distance, but it can adapted
to a particular application. Consider that the adversary has
observed r outputs (zr) and wants to estimate the location
xs with s ≤ r. For this, she uses an attack h that produces
an estimation xˆs(zr). The average adversary error at query r
regarding xs can be defined as
PAE(f, h, r, s)
.
= E{dP (xs, xˆs(zr))} , (5)
where the expectation is taken over xs and zr (the attack is
deterministic, i.e., xˆs is a function of zr). Given a mobility
model p(x), this metric can be computed analytically as
PtheoAE (f, h, r, s) =
∑
xr∈X r
∑
zr∈Zr
p(xr)p(zr|xr)dP (xs, xˆs(zr)) .
(6)
Empirically, for each realization of x and z, we obtain the
adversary estimation xˆs(zr), and then compute the average
adversary error as
PpracAE (f, h, r, s) = Eemp{dP (xs, xˆs(zr))} . (7)
We acknowledge that there are other privacy metrics, e.g.,
the conditional entropy [9] and geo-indistinguishability [18].
In our empirical evaluation in Sect. VII-C we discuss how our
findings affect those metrics.
III. MOBILITY MODELS FOR LPPM DESIGN
As we explained before, in order to design LPPMs, the
user needs to assume a model that characterizes her mobility
behavior, i.e., a model for p(x). In this section, we explain the
main mobility models assumed in the literature: the sporadic
mobility model, and the Markov model (non-sporadic). We
do not claim that there is a correct mobility model for p(x)
that the user should follow. However, it is true that LPPMs
optimized for a certain model will perform better when the
actual user location traces follow such model. In other words,
models that are closer to the real behavior of the user are more
useful.
A. Sporadic Model
The sporadic location privacy model assumes that the real
locations of the user in two different queries, i.e., xr and xs,
are not temporally dependent. As we argued before, this makes
sense in some scenarios where the user requests information
from the LBS infrequently (e.g., a user that queries for the
weather in her area is not likely to perform the another query
in a short period of time).
The sporadic model characterizes p(x) using a parameter
called the mobility profile, denoted by pi (Fig. 3, left, and
Fig. 4). The mobility profile is an abstraction that represents
the long-term user behavior, i.e., the probability with which
the user visits each location x ∈ X . Thus, given pi, we can
write
p(x|pi) =
ρ∏
r=1
p(xr|pi) =
ρ∏
r=1
pi(xr) , (8)
where we have used pi(x) to denote the probability that the
user’s real location is x given the profile pi.
This model has been widely used in the literature [2], [5],
[8], [9], mainly for its simplicity: using the fact that two check-
ins xr and xs are independent allows the user to design LPPMs
that only need the current input xr to generate the next output
zr.
B. Continuous Model: Markov
In some scenarios, the sporadic model for user mobility is
not appropriate. For example, when a user queries the LBS
continuously (e.g., live location sharing in social networks),
we cannot assume that the location xr+1 is independent of the
previous one xr (e.g., because physical constraints such as the
user speed or roads existence and direction). In those cases,
continuous models that specify the dependencies between the
real locations are more adequate to design LPPMs.
The most typical model in this scenario is the Markov
model. As its name suggests, this model characterizes xr
as a Markov chain. More specifically, Markov models are
defined by two parameters: an initial mobility profile pi0, and
a transition matrix M (Fig. 3, right, and Fig. 4). The initial
Fig. 3: Sporadic (left) and
Markov (right) models of
user mobility.
Meaning
pi Mobility profile
p(xr|pi) = pi(xr)
pi0 Initial mob. prof.
p(x1|pi0) = pi0(x1)
M Transition matrix.
p(xr+1|xr,M) =
M(xr+1|xr)
Fig. 4: Notation and meaning
of the model parameters.
profile models the probability of the first location of the user,
i.e., p(x1|pi0) = pi0(x1). The transition matrix M is a |X |×|X |
matrix whose (r, r − 1)-th element characterizes p(xri |xr−1j ),
regardless of r > 1. We use M(xr|xr−1) to denote the
probability that the user transitions from location xr−1 to xr
according to the matrix M . The probability of a trace p(x)
according to the Markov model is thus
p(x|pi0,M) =
ρ∏
r=1
p(xr|xr−1, pi0,M)
= pi0(x
1) ·
ρ∏
r=2
M(xr|xr−1) .
The Markov model has been widely used in non-sporadic
location privacy, due to its simplicity [7], [13]. Note that in
the Markov model, the user’s mobility behavior only depends
on her current location, and not the past trace. It is possible
to define more complicated models for continuous location
release (e.g., characterize p(xr|xr−1)), but since these are
rarely used, we do not consider them in this work.
C. Hardwiring Training Data into the Mobility Model
After the user chooses one model to design her LPPM, she
has to decide how to estimate the parameters of that model
(i.e., pi in the sporadic model, pi0 and M in the Markov
model). In the literature, to the best of our knowledge, all of
the proposals rely on some training information to determine
these parameters [1], [2], [4], [5], [7]–[9], [13], [19]. After
this training phase, the model parameters remain fixed during
the evaluation. We call the models that are built in this
way hardwired models. Hardwired models are tailored to the
training data a-priori during training, and their parameters
are never updated or adapted for users that deviate from the
training data behavior. Therefore, the LPPMs designed with
these models will be optimal in practice if the users’ behavior
is perfectly captured by the training data. If this is not the
case, or if the training data is insufficient or nonexistent, it is
reasonable that the LPPMs designed with hardwired models
will perform worse than expected. We confirm this conjecture
later in Section V.
IV. LPPM DESIGN IN HARDWIRED MODELS
In this section, we overview previous approaches to design
LPPMs leveraging hardwired models for user mobility. We
consider optimal LPPM designs, i.e., defense mechanisms
that, under a certain mobility model, maximize the privacy
metric PAE against the best possible attack given a constraint
on the maximum average loss Q allowed. We note that,
given a mobility model, there is a familiy of LPPMs that
are all optimal (i.e., all of them achieve the maximum PAE
given a constraint on Q), as proven in [9]. However, there
are no universally optimal LPPMs in practice, i.e., when
evaluated with testing data against an optimal attack. Thus,
it is important to keep in mind that, even if two members of
a family of optimal LPPMs perform equally in theory, they
might perform differently in practice.
We explain LPPM design for the r-th release: the user
is at location xr and wants to query the LBS by releasing
an obfuscated location zr. The user knows all her previous
real and obfuscated locations, i.e., xr−1 and zr−1, and the
LBS/adversary knows the previously released locations zr−1.
The optimal LPPM design problem can be written mathemat-
ically as
f = argmax
f
min
h
PAE(f, h, r, r) ,
subject to Q(f, r) ≤ Qmax.
(9)
Note that f must satisfy some additional constraints since it
is a probability density function, but we have omitted those
from (9) for simplicity. Also, we have considered just the case
where the user wants to protect her current location at time r.
We note however that the user could set other goals, like trying
to protect the privacy of future location releases PAE(f, h, r, s)
for s > r, past locations (s < r), or a combination of both.
Our findings could be adapted to such cases, but we do not
study them here for simplicity and space restrictions.
We also limit ourselves to optimal output-based LPPMs, i.e.,
defenses that can be characterized by f(zr|zr−1, xr) and do
not depend on previous inputs xr−1. We do this to avoid the
computational issues that stem from the fact that, in order to
guarantee that an LPPM is optimal, the user has to assess
its privacy against an optimal attack. In order to do this
with a full-LPPM f(zr|zr−1,xr), she has to characterize the
posterior probability of the secret locations after releasing the
obfuscated locations, i.e., p(xr|zr−1). If x ∈ X and X is
discrete, this requires handling |X |r values, which quickly
becomes unfeasible for any computer (e.g., in a small map
with |X | = 200 discrete locations, if we represent a float with
4 bytes, to protect only r = 8 locations we would need over
1 million Terabytes). Since measuring the privacy against an
optimal adversary is unfeasible in full-type LPPMs, we do not
consider them in our design approaches.
Note that this computational issue is not a problem in
output-based LPPMs. This is because, in this case, to as-
sess the performance against an optimal adversary the user
internally computes p(xr|zr−1). She only needs to handle |X |
parameters for this, since zr−1 have been seen in the past by
both the user and the adversary, so they can be treated as fixed
parameters at time r.
Below, we explain how to compute optimal LPPMs in the
sporadic and Markov hardwired models.
A. LPPM Design in the Hardwired Sporadic Model
In the literature, we find many works that study LPPM
design under the sporadic hardwired model for user mo-
bility. Most works consider that the LPPM belongs to the
memoryless type f(zr|xr), either for tractability [5], [9] or
because they focus on single queries [2], [8]. In Appendix A,
we formally prove that, in the hardwired model, a properly
designed LPPM of the memoryless type does not provide less
privacy than an LPPM of the full type f(zr|zr−1,xr). This
means that considering full-type or output-based LPPMs just
complicates the problem and does not provide any advantage
over memoryless LPPMs.
There are two main approaches to compute optimal LPPMs
in sporadic models:
Linear Programming Approaches. Shokri et al. provide a
technique to design optimal LPPMs given any pair of functions
dP (·) and dQ(·) [5]. This approach consists on solving a linear
program, which can only be done, for computational reasons,
if the spaces of real (X ) and obfuscated (Z) locations are
discrete. The program receives the mobility profile pi which
determines the distribution of xr, and returns an optimal
LPPM f(zr|xr). If the number of discrete locations is N ,
the linear program contains N(N + 1) bounded variables,
N2 + 1 inequality constraints, and N equality constraints.
Therefore, finding an optimal obfuscation mechanism using
linear programming is only feasible if the number of discrete
locations is modest.
Also, Oya et al. showed in [9] that the algorithm used to
solve the linear program greatly affects the performance of
the resulting LPPM in terms of other privacy metrics (e.g.,
the conditional entropy). The recommendation in [9] is to use
an interior-point algorithm, rather than a simplex algorithm.
Remapping Techniques. In [8], Chatzikokolakis et al. pro-
pose a technique called optimal remapping that provides
an average loss improvement for any memoryless LPPM,
without reducing privacy. They proposed this method under the
hardwired sporadic mobility model. We describe this technique
briefly, since we use it in this work. Let f˜ be an obfuscation
mechanism, and let z˜r be an obfuscated location generated
from xr using such LPPM. Before reporting z˜r, the user can
compute the posterior p(xr|z˜r) using pi(xr) and f˜ . With this
posterior, she can compute an alternative obfuscated location
zr:
zr = argmin
zr
∑
xr∈X
p(xr|z˜r) · dQ(xr, zr) . (10)
By reporting zr (instead of z˜r), the user achieves a reduction
on her average loss (if the mobility profile pi of the sporadic
model used to compute (10) is close to her real behavior).
Also, note that no information about the previous or current
input is used in the remapping (since the posterior is computed
only using the current output and pi, which are known to the
adversary). This means that, by performing this “remapping”
from z˜r to zr, the privacy of the resulting LPPM cannot
decrease.
Later, in [9], Oya et al. proved that if the distance func-
tions used to measure privacy and utility are the same (i.e.,
dP (·) ≡ dQ(·)), the LPPM that results from remapping any
LPPM is optimal in the hardwired sporadic mobility model.
This technique can even be applied to design LPPMs when
their output space is the plane Z ≡ R2. Overall, solving (10) is
much faster than solving the linear program mentioned above,
although it only yields optimal LPPMs if dP (·) ≡ dQ(·).
B. LPPM Design in the Hardwired Markov Model
In the Markov model, the input locations x1, x2, . . . are
correlated. This creates dependencies between past released
locations zr−1 and the current location xr, that the user must
take into account when designing the LPPM.
To the best of our knowledge, the only approach to compute
optimal LPPMs under the Markov mobility model consists on
solving a linear program [7], [13]. We explain this approach,
and then extend the remapping techniques of sporadic models
so that we can efficiently design optimal LPPMs under the
Markov model.
Linear Programming Approaches. Theodorakopoulos et
al. [13] extend the linear programming approach of [5] to the
non-sporadic location privacy case. They propose a framework
where the user can specify which obfuscated location(s) she
wants to generate at time r, which real locations she wants
to protect, and which obfuscated locations were released to
the LBS in the past. In their implementation, they specifically
consider a Markov model for user mobility. In the case we
are studying, where the user wants to release zr to protect xr
and zr−1 have already been released, the approach works as
follows.
For the first release (r = 1), the user just takes the initial
profile pi0(x1) and solves a linear program analogous to the
sporadic location privacy one [5]. This produces an LPPM
f(z1|x1) that maximizes the privacy metric given a quality
loss constraint. Then, she computes the posterior p(x1|z1)
using pi0(x1) and Bayes’ formula, and uses it to obtain the
probability distribution of the next real location given the
released location: p(x2|z1) = ∑x1∈X M(x2|x1) · p(x1|z1).
For the next releases (r > 1), the steps are analogous, but
they use p(xr|zr−1) instead of pi0. Particularly, before the r-
th query the user knows p(xr|zr−1). With this probability
distribution, the user can solve a linear program to find an
optimal LPPM f(zr|zr−1, xr). Then, she can compute the
posterior using Bayes’ formula:
p(xr|zr) = f(z
r|zr−1, xr) · p(xr|zr−1)∑
x˜r∈X f(zr|zr−1, x˜r) · p(x˜r|zr−1)
, (11)
and update it for the next step using the Markov transition
matrix:
p(xr+1|zr) =
∑
xr∈X
M(xr+1|xr) · p(xr|zr) . (12)
In [7], [13], the authors evaluate their LPPMs theoretically,
i.e., they compute the average adversary error and average loss
that the user would have if she followed the Markov model
using the analytical expressions (3) and (6). For example, they
compute f(z2|z1, x2) for all possible values of z2, z1, x2.
Therefore, for computational reasons, they do not evaluate the
performance of these LPPMs for more than r = 3 consecutive
locations. During an empirical evaluation, however, one does
not need to store all possible values of these variables. Since
the past obfuscated locations zr−1 are known both to the user
and the adversary, the user can just compute f(zr|zr−1, xr)
by assuming that zr−1 is fixed. Therefore, the computational
cost of computing this Markov-based LPPM in each query is
the same as solving the linear program in the sporadic case.
Remapping Techniques. Even though the complexity of the
linear programming approach in the Markov scenario is the
same as in the sporadic scenario, if the number of discrete
locations we consider is not small, finding an optimal LPPM is
still computationally expensive. To solve this issue, we extend
the remapping techniques to the Markov scenario. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first time these techniques are
extended beyond the sporadic location privacy scenario.
Assume that, at the time of the r-th location release, the
user has computed p(xr|zr−1) according to the Markov model.
Let f˜ be any memoryless-LPPM f˜(z˜r|xr). The user uses this
LPPM to generate a temporary z˜r, and then computes the
posterior
p(xr|z˜r, zr−1) = f˜(z˜
r|xr) · p(xr|zr−1)∑
x˜r∈X f˜(z˜r|x˜r) · p(x˜r|zr−1)
. (13)
With this posterior, she can then compute the final location
that she releases
zr = argmin
zr
∑
xr∈X
p(xr|z˜r, zr−1) · dQ(xr, zr) . (14)
This process defines a new LPPM f(zr|zr−1, xr). At this
point, the user can compute p(xr+1|zr) for the next release
following (11) and (12). Computing the LPPM by solving
(14) is much faster than solving the linear program explained
above. Also, the LPPM that results form the remapping can
be shown to be optimal in the hardwired Markov model if
dP (·) ≡ dQ(·) (c.f. [9]).
V. EVALUATION: OPTIMAL HARDWIRED LPPMS
In this section, we evaluate the optimal LPPMs derived
for hardwired models that we described in Sect. IV using
the evaluation framework in Section II-B. For readability
and clarity, we use the term SP-LPPM to denote a generic
LPPM that is optimal under the hardwired SPoradic mobility
model [5], [8], [9]. This LPPM can be computed by following
any of the techniques explained in Sect. IV-A. Likewise, we
use MK-LPPM to denote an LPPM that is optimal under
the hardwired MarKov mobility model [7], [13] (we can
compute it as explained in Sect. IV-B). Note that SP-LPPM
and MK-LPPM denote families of optimal LPPMs (i.e., there
are infinite instantiations of them that meet their optimality
conditions).
TABLE II: Terminology for the experiments.
SP-LPPM Family of optimal LPPMs developed with the hardwired
sporadic mobility mode (Sect. IV-A).
MK-LPPM Family of optimal LPPMs developed with the hardwired
Markov mobility mode (Sect. IV-B).
SP-LH Optimal location hiding LPPM from the SP-LPPM family.
SP-Exp Optimal exponential LPPM from the SP-LPPM family.
MK-LH Optimal location hiding LPPM from the MK-LPPM family.
MK-Exp Optimal exponential LPPM from the MK-LPPM family.
TABLE III: Summary of the experiments to evaluate hardwired
LPPMs.
Experiment SP Experiment MK
Evaluation target SP-LPPM MK-LPPM
Datasets
Gowalla (shuffled) Gowalla
Brightkite (shuffled) Brightkite
TaxiCab
Distance function Manhattan (dP ≡ dQ)
LPPM Loc. Hiding (SP-LH) Loc. Hiding (MK-LH)Exponential (SP-Exp) Exponential (MK-Exp)
Attack we evaluate Optimal Sporadic Optimal Markov
We perform two different experiments: one to evaluate
SP-LPPM in the sporadic location release scenario (Exper-
iment SP), and another one to evaluate MK-LPPM in the
continuous location release scenario (Experiment MK). For
these experiments, we consider three datasets, two different
instantiations of SP-LPPM and MK-LPPM, and two optimal
attacks. We explain these choices below. Table II summarizes
the new terminology of this evaluation, and Table III shows
the configuration of our experiments.
Datasets. We consider three datasets: Brightkite1, Gowalla2,
and TaxiCab traces from CRAWDAD.3 Each dataset con-
tains location traces identified by the user ID, latitude, lon-
gitude, and timestamp. We take user check-ins inside the
San Francisco region between latitude coordinates 37.5500
and 37.8010, and longitude coordinates −122.5153 and
−122.3789. Then, we quantize the area into 25 × 10 cells
and consider the centers of these cells as our alphabets
X = Z = Xˆ , as in [7], [13].
Gowalla and Brightkite are examples of datasets with very
sparse check-in behavior (e.g., in Gowalla, each user has
an average of 60 check-ins during over 20 months of data
collection). Thus, in these datasets we separate 20 users that
have at least 300 check-ins inside the San Francisco region,
regardless of when those check-ins were made, and save the
remaining check-ins of all the other users together (around
35 000 in Brightkite and 75 600 in Gowalla).
Regarding the training/testing separation, we use the last
5 users in these datasets as testing sets, and we consider
two training settings: in the first setting, that we call scarce
training, the users train their LPPMs with the traces of the
first 15 users (4 500 locations). In the second setting, that we
call rich training, each user trains her model using the check-
1https://snap.stanford.edu/data/loc-brightkite.html
2https://snap.stanford.edu/data/loc-gowalla.html
3https://crawdad.org/epfl/mobility/20090224/
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Fig. 5: Processed datasets that we collected. We consider two
training settings for each dataset (scarce and rich). For each
of these settings, the figure displays the training data in green,
and the testing data in orange.
ins of all the other users in the dataset (35 000 in Brightkite,
75 600 in Gowalla). This is depicted in Fig. 5a.
TaxiCab contains very dense location reports of cabs in the
San Francisco region over 30 days. In this case, we organize
each user’s traces by days, and discard those days where the
user remains silent for more than 2 hours. Then, we select 10
users for which we retain at least 10 days. For each trace, we
select one check-in for each period of 5 minutes (considering
that the user remained in the same location if she did not
perform a new check-in in the last 5 minutes). This way, we
build, for each user, a set of 10 days with 288 check-ins (288·5
minutes = 1 day).
In this dataset, we evaluate the performance of each user
in her last 3 days. We consider two settings for the training
data: in our first setting (scarce), each user uses her first day
as training data. In our second setting (rich), each user trains
her model using her first 7 days of data (Fig. 5b).
Training the LPPMs. We explain how the users estimate
the parameters of the models that they use to build optimal
LPPMs. For the LPPMs built using the hardwired sporadic
model (SP-LPPM), each user computes pi as a normalized
histogram of the training set traces, i.e., she counts the number
of check-ins in each location x ∈ X in the training data and
normalizes by the total number of check-ins.
For LPPMs built using the hardwired Markov model
(MK-LPPM), each user computes pi0 as a normalized histogram
of the location check-ins in the training data, and builds the
transition probabilities M(xi|xj) by counting the number of
transitions from xj to xi in the data, and normalizing. Note
that, ideally, the user would compute pi0 using her first location
of each day (in the TaxiCab dataset) but we do not have
sufficient data to follow this approach.
LPPM instantiations. For each family of optimal LPPMs
(SP-LPPM and MK-LPPM) we test the performance of two
different instantiations:
• LH refers to location hiding: for each input location xr,
the user chooses randomly between revealing her real
location zr = xr (with probability α) or not revealing any
information (with probability 1−α). We model the second
case as picking uniformly at random another location of
the map. We test 10 values of α = 0, 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1 to
study the trade-off between PAE and Q. We apply an
optimal remapping to this LPPM to make it optimal: the
remapping in Sect. IV-A gives us an SP-LPPM that we
denote SP-LH, and the remapping in Sect. IV-B gives us
an MK-LPPM that we denote MK-LH.
• Exp is the exponential LPPM [20]: this LPPM re-
ports location zr with a probability proportional to
exp(−dQ(xr, zr) · ) (i.e., it has an exponentially de-
creasing probability of reporting locations that are far
from the real location). We test 10 values of  =
0km−1, 0.02km−1, 0.04km−1, . . . , 0.02km−1 to tune the
average loss and privacy of this LPPM. We apply an
optimal remapping to this LPPM to build an optimal
defense (denoted SP-Exp and MK-Exp for the sporadic
and Markov models, respectively).
Attacks. As we mentioned in Section II-B, we consider
a worst-case adversary which deploys optimal attacks con-
structed with information about the testing data. The optimal
attacks, after observing zr, compute the posterior p(xr|zr) and
pick the xˆr that minimizes the privacy PAE. We consider two
attacks: a sporadic-based and a Markov-based attack. These
attacks use the actual mobility profiles and transition matrices
of the users (i.e., computed from the testing data) to perform
their estimation xˆr.
In all of our experiments, we use the Manhattan distance
as the distance metric for privacy dP (·) and utility dQ(·). We
think this is a reasonable choice, since our traces belong to
metropolitan areas, where the Manhattan distance between two
points is close to the physical distance that a car/person has
to traverse to move from one point to the other. We measure
distance in kilometers (km), but this could be converted to
time (by dividing it by speed) or another metric related to the
physical distance between two points.
We note that, since we chose dP (·) ≡ dQ(·), the theoretical
performance of any optimal LPPM is PAE = Q, as shown
empirically in [5] and proven analytically in [9]. This means
that any optimal LPPM evaluated in the same data used for its
training would achieve PAE = Q. This is true for SP-LH and
SP-Exp against the optimal sporadic attack, and for MK-LH
and MK-Exp against the optimal Markov attack. We see below
that, when these optimal LPPMs are evaluated on a testing set
that is different from the training data, they do not achieve
this optimal privacy level, i.e., in practice, PAE < Q.
We explain how we generate the plots in our evaluation.
Given a particular experiment, user, and LPPM setting, we
compute Q(f, r) and PAE(f, h, r, r) by averaging 40 repetitions
of our experiment when users use SP-LH and MK-LH, and
20 repetitions when they use SP-Exp and MK-Exp (i.e.,
we repeat the process of computing the LPPM, generating
obfuscated locations and computing the adversary estimation
20/40 times). Then, we average the performance over r (i.e.,
Q .= 1/ρ
∑ρ
r=1 Q(f, r) and PAE
.
= 1/ρ
∑ρ
r=1 PAE(f, h, r, r)).
This gives us, for each user that we evaluate, points along their
PAE vs. Q performance line. Finally, we generate quality loss
values linearly spaced between 0 and 4km and, using linear
interpolation, compute the average, maximum and minimum
privacy over the users for each of those quality loss values.
All of our experiments are conducted using Python 3.
A. Experiment SP: Sporadic Hardwired LPPMs
We evaluate SP-LH and SP-Exp against the optimal
sporadic-based attack that uses the real mobility profile of the
user. We use only Gowalla and Brightkite datasets for this ex-
periment, since Taxicab is more characteristic of non-sporadic
mobility behaviors. For each simulation of this experiment,
we randomly shuffle the user traces (i.e., each column in the
matrix represented in Fig. 5a). We do this to break any possible
timing correlation that remains in these datasets and ensure
that our evaluation of these LPPMs is fair.
Figure 6 shows the results, where the blue and orange lines
represent the average privacy of the users when they use the
scarce and rich training data, respectively. The shaded area
represents the minimum and maximum privacy among the
users that we evaluate. We see that, in both datasets, and
regardless of the LPPM type, the privacy of the users evaluated
with a testing data that differs from the training information
is below the theoretical value PAE = Q. Also, training with
the rich training set provides more privacy on average, since
this dataset has more information about the sporadic check-in
behavior of the users (35 000−75 600 check-ins, versus 4 500
check-ins of the scarce dataset). However, this improvement is
slight: none of the training sets capture the real user behavior
precisely, since both contain data from different users. Some of
the users that we evaluate have a behavior that is particularly
different from the training data (e.g., lower shaded area in
Fig. 6b), and thus achieve very low privacy. This experiment
shows that training an optimal sporadic LPPM with location
data from other users (e.g., [8]) is very dangerous from a
privacy standpoint.
B. Experiment MK: Markov Hardwired LPPMs
We evaluate MK-LH and MK-Exp against the optimal
Markov adversary. Figure 7 shows the performance in
Brightkite and Gowalla, and Fig. 8 shows the performance
in TaxiCab dataset. The results in Brightkite and Gowalla are
very similar to the ones in the previous experiment, i.e., an
optimal Markov LPPM that has been designed by hardwiring
it on training data from other users provides significantly less
privacy than expected in theory.
The results in TaxiCab dataset, however, are significantly
better for the users. This is because, in this dataset, we have
continuous location data (i.e., one location reported every
5 minutes). This means that two consecutive locations are
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Fig. 6: Experiment SP. Performance of SP-Exp and SP-LH against the optimal sporadic attack in Brightkite and Gowalla
datasets (with shuffled traces).
highly correlated because of road restrictions (e.g., one-way
roads, mandatory turns, etc.). Cabs follow very different paths
each day, and thus it would seem that training their LPPMs
with past data should not be significantly beneficial for them.
However, the training data encodes these road restrictions.
This is very important: the optimal Markov LPPMs are thus
designed taking these constraints into account. Since the road
restrictions are also part of the testing data, the optimal Markov
LPPM is able to get close to optimal performance during
evaluation. We also observe that training with seven days of
data (rich training) is slightly better than training with a single
day (scarce training). This slight improvement suggests that
a single day of training already encodes most of the road
restrictions. To validate this hypothesis, we also conducted
experiments where we train each user’s LPPM with past
location traces of different users, and the results were similar
(see Appendix C). This confirms that taking road constraints
into account is of paramount importance towards achieving
high protection in continuous non-sporadic location privacy.
Finally, MK-Exp performs better than MK-LH. These results
support the findings in [9], where authors showed that expo-
nential mechanisms perform significantly better than location
hiding techniques when evaluated with metrics they have not
been optimized for. In our case, we see that MK-Exp performs
better than MK-LH when evaluated in testing data it has not
been optimized for.
VI. BLANK-SLATE MODELS
We have seen that hardwiring the training data into the
mobility models used for LPPM design can be detrimental
to privacy. To alleviate this issue, we propose blank-slate
models for user mobility. These models treat their parameters
(pi in the sporadic case; or pi0 and M in the Markov case)
as unknown variables that are never completely known to
the user when designing her LPPM. These parameters can
be initialized a-priori with training data, but do not remain
fixed. Instead, the user updates them a-posteriori, as she
acquires additional information from the observations (e.g.,
x and z, from the testing set). Therefore, we can expect that
LPPMs developed with blank-slate models will be desirable in
situations where the training data does not adequately capture
the user’s mobility traits, either because it does not contain
sufficient information or because it captures mobility patterns
that are not characteristic of the user in question.
There are many ways in which a user can implement a
blank-slate model. For example, a user can train a distribution
on the hidden parameter (e.g., p(pi)) based on training data,
and then estimate this parameter a-posteriori using x and z
(e.g., a maximum a-posteriori approach). In our case, we take
a maximum likelihood approach that we explain below. We
present a new family of LPPMs, the Profile Estimation-Based
LPPMs (PEB-LPPMs), that we build by leveraging a sporadic
blank-slate model for user mobility. We do not tackle the
problem of LPPM design under blank-slate Markov mobility
models, but we show that our PEB-LPPM is also useful for
users whose mobility model is Markovian.
A. LPPM Design in the Sporadic Blank-Slate Model
A sporadic blank-slate model is characterized by a mobility
profile pi that is unknown to the user. In order to design
an LPPM using this model, the user must first estimate this
mobility profile. We propose to use a Maximum Likelihood
Estimator (MLE) of the mobility profile before each query r,
and then use this profile to build an optimal sporadic LPPM.
We call the LPPM designed this way Profile Estimation Based
(PEB)-LPPM.
More precisely, a PEB-LPPM is an output-based defense,
i.e., characterized by f(zr|zr−1, xr), that is computed by
following these steps:
1) Compute an MLE of the mobility profile pi using zr−1.
Let this estimate be pˆirML.
2) Normalize the estimate pˆirML to avoid variance issues for
low r, producing pˆir.
3) Compute the optimal LPPM in the sporadic mobility
model using pˆir and generate zr randomly using xr and
this newly created LPPM.
This whole process can be embedded into a function of the
form f(zr|zr−1, xr) that defines the PEB-LPPM.
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Fig. 7: Experiment MK: Performance of MK-Exp and MK-LH, against the optimal Markov attack in Brightkite and Gowalla
datasets.
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Fig. 8: Experiment MK: Performance of MK-Exp and MK-LH
against the optimal Markov attack in Taxicab dataset.
Note that, in the first step above, the user could have
also used her past real locations xr−1 to compute the MLE
estimation of her mobility profile (since she knows them).
This, effectively, would result on a full-LPPM f(zr|zr−1,xr).
As we mentioned in Section IV, assessing the privacy of
these LPPMs against an optimal adversary is computationally
intractable. Thus, to avoid gaps in our evaluation, we only use
zr−1 to compute our MLE of the mobility profile. We delve
into the steps of the PEB-LPPM design below.
B. Step 1: Mobility Profile Estimation.
We derive the Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) of
the mobility profile given zr. We use pii ≡ p(x = xi) to
denote the probability mass function defined by pi. Let P
be the set of all the possible mobility profiles, i.e., P .=
{pi|∑|X |i=1 pii = 1, pii ≥ 0}. The MLE of the mobility profile
is the estimation pˆirML that maximizes p(z
r|pi), i.e.,
pˆirML = argmax
pi∈P
p(zr|pi) . (15)
Solving this problem directly is complicated, since zr is
not generated directly from pi, but from xr. We use the
Expectation-Maximization (EM) method [21] to find an ef-
ficient way of computing this estimator. We rely on xr as
auxiliary data, and define the auxiliary function Q as
Q(pi, pit)
.
= E{log p(xr|pi)|Z = zr,Π = pit} . (16)
The EM method iterates over two steps: first, compute
Q(pi, pit) (E-step), and then find pit+1 as the profile pi that
maximizes Q(pi, pit) (M-step). We expand Q as
Q(pi, pit)
.
= E{log p(xr|pi)|Zr = zr,Π = pit}
=
r∑
s=1
E{log p(xs|pi)|Zr = zr,Π = pit}
=
r∑
s=1
|X |∑
i=1
log pii · p(xri |zr, pit)
=
|X |∑
i=1
log pii ·
[
r∑
s=1
p(xsi |zr, pit)
]
.
(17)
In order to find the pi ∈ P that maximizes Q(pi, pit), we
build the Lagrange multipliers function
L(pi, λ,µ) = Q(pi, pit) + λ
 |X |∑
i=1
pii − 1
+ |X |∑
i=1
µipii , (18)
where the term with λ corresponds to the constraint∑|X |
i=1 pii = 1 and the terms with µi correspond to pii ≥ 0. We
take µi = 0 for the non-negativity constraints, and by solving
∂L/∂pii = 0 and ∂L/∂λ = 0 we obtain the maximum, which
gives us the update rule pit+1i =
1
r
∑r
s=1 p(x
s
i |zs, pit). We use
Bayes’ Rule to expand p(xsi |zs, pit) and we finally obtain
pit+1i =
1
r
r∑
s=1
piti · f(zs|zs−1, xsi )∑|X |
k=1 pi
t
k · f(zs|zs−1, xsk)
. (19)
Following [22], we can see that this solution is the global
maximum of Q(pi, pit), since it meets the KKT conditions,
Q(pi, pit) is strictly concave on pi (it is a weighted sum of
logarithms) and P is a convex set.
Summarizing, in order to compute the MLE of the mobil-
ity profile, one proceeds as follows. First, define an initial
profile pi0. Then, follow the update rule given by (19) until
convergence (i.e., until the change from pit to pit+1 is small
enough). This algorithm is ensured to converge to the MLE
for memoryless and output-based LPPMs, as we prove in
Appendix B.
C. Step 2: MLE Normalization
The accuracy of the MLE estimator above depends on the
number of queries done previously. For example, we can
expect to have a worse estimation of pi if we compute it at time
r = 2 using only z1, compared to computing it at time r = 100
with z99. To alleviate this issue, we perform a normalization
step. Let piini be an initial mobility profile (e.g., a uniform
profile, a profile computed from auxiliary data, or a profile
computed from the training data as in hardwired models), and
let γ > 0 be a constant. The final mobility profile after the
normalization step is
pˆir =
1
rγ
· piini +
(
1− 1
rγ
)
· pˆirML . (20)
The coefficient γ tunes how fast the effect of piini in pˆir fades
with r. For example, if the user does not have enough data
to compute a reliable initial profile piini, she can simply set
γ = 0.5 so that pˆir converges fast to the ML estimate pˆirML.
If the user believes that piini is representative of her current
mobility behavior, a slower rate γ = 0.1 is more appropriate.
D. Step 3: Final LPPM Computation
Once the user has computed her estimation of the mobility
profile pˆir she builds an optimal memoryless LPPM for the
sporadic location privacy case (e.g., using the linear program-
ming or the optimal remapping approach we explained in
Section IV-A). Using this LPPM, she samples the obfuscated
location zr given her real location xr.
VII. EVALUATION OF PROFILE ESTIMATION-BASED
LPPMS
We evaluate the performance of the PEB-LPPMs that we
developed with the blank-slate sporadic mobility model, and
compare them with the optimal LPPMs that we evaluated ear-
lier. We use the notation PEB-LH and PEB-Exp to denote the
location hiding and exponential LPPMs computed following
the PEB-LPPM strategy in Sect. VI. We compute piini from
the training set and chose γ = 0.5 so that the PEB-LPPMs
adapt quickly to the MLE of the mobility profile. This means
that, after r = 100 queries, the mobility profile that is used
for design pˆir in (20) is pˆir = 0.1 · piini + 0.9 · pˆirML.
We split the evaluation into two parts, using the same
settings of Section V (see Table III). Since PEB-LPPMs learn
the user behavior as she queries the LBS, we can expect that
their performance will improve over time. Therefore, instead
of averaging Q(f, r) and PAE(f, h, r, r) over all values of r,
we perform the average over the first and last halves separately
(e.g.,
∑150
r=1 . . . and
∑300
r=151 . . . in Brightkite/Gowalla). The
performance of PEB-LPPMs averaged over the last half of the
location releases is practically independent of the initial profile
piini since, for r > 150, (20) becomes pˆir ≈ pˆirML.
A. Experiment SP with PEB-LPPMs
First, we evaluate PEB-LPPMs in the sporadic scenario.
We compare the performance of PEB-LH and PEB-Exp with
SP-LH and SP-Exp, against the optimal sporadic adversary.
We use only the rich data to train SP-LH and SP-Exp and
to initialize PEB-LH and PEB-Exp (for simplicity). Figure 9
shows the results. The blue line corresponds to the orange line
in Fig. 6 (SP-LPPM trained with the rich data). The orange
line is the average performance of PEB-LPPMs in the first 150
samples, and the green line is the average performance in last
150 samples. We can see that PEB-LPPMs always outperform
hardwired ones (SP-LPPM) in the sporadic scenario, and
that the performance of PEB-LPPMs improves with r. This
is reasonable, as these mechanisms estimate the real user
behavior adaptively during the evaluation, and with higher r
values this estimation is more accurate. These results show
that disregarding the training data and relying solely on the
MLE of the mobility profile (PEB-LH and PEB-Exp with
r > 150) can yield LPPMs that offer better protection than
those hardwired on the training data (SP-LH and SP-Exp).
B. Experiment MK with PEB-LPPMs
Now, we compare PEB-LH and PEB-Exp with MK-LH and
MK-Exp against the optimal Markov adversary, in the settings
of Experiment MK. Figure 10 shows the results for Brightkite
and Gowalla, and Fig. 11 for TaxiCab. In Brightkite and
Gowalla, we use only the rich training data to build MK-LPPM.
Here, even though PEB-LPPMs are built upon the sporadic
blank-slate mobility model, they are on-par with optimal
Markov designs in non-sporadic location privacy settings, and
in many cases outperform them. This is because Brightkite
and Gowalla are datasets where user check-ins are not strongly
correlated. This means that capturing the road restrictions is
not decisive towards achieving a good privacy performance,
and therefore PEB-LPPMs can compete with MK-LPPM. Note
that the performance of PEB-LPPMs decreases with r in
Gowalla. This is due to the fact that the MLE of the mobility
profile uses all the past observations and does not give more
weight to recent ones. If the user behavior changes drastically
at some point in the trace (e.g., around r = 150), the MLE will
not be able to follow this change, and thus the performance of
the PEB-LPPM will decrease. It would be interesting to study
how to adjust PEB-LPPMs so that they give more weight to
recent location releases when estimating the mobility profile
of the user.
The situation changes in TaxiCab dataset (Fig. 11). In this
case, even though we have decided to train MK-LPPM using
the scarce training set (one day of data for each user), this is
enough for MK-LPPM to achieve an outstanding performance
(as we saw in Fig. 8). This is because, in TaxiCab dataset,
the locations are tightly correlated due to road restrictions.
PEB-LPPMs are built leveraging a sporadic blank-slate model,
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Fig. 9: Experiment SP: Performance of PEB-LPPMs versus SP-LPPM, using Brightkite and Gowalla datasets (shuffled).
SP-LPPM have been trained with the rich data.
so they cannot capture these restrictions, and thus perform
poorly in this dataset. Note that increasing r does not have a
significant effect in the performance, since it does not matter
how accurately the profile estimation of PEB-LPPMs is: a
(sporadic) mobility profile cannot capture the correlations of
non-sporadic models.
C. Summary of Results and Other Privacy Metrics
PEB-LPPMs outperform optimal hardwired LPPMs in all
of our sporadic location privacy experiments. This is reason-
able, as in these experiments the training data cannot closely
characterize the behavior of the testing set users. This does not
mean that PEB-LPPMs always outperform hardwired LPPMs
in sporadic location release scenarios: if user behavior can be
accurately modeled by the training data, the performance of
hardwired LPPMs would be close to optimal. However, we
can confirm that PEB-LPPMs are a powerful tool to protect
users whose mobility behavior cannot be predicted from the
training data.
In non-sporadic location privacy, our experiments show
that PEB-LPPMs can outperform optimal Markov LPPMs
when the user’s real locations are not highly correlated (i.e.,
Brightkite and Gowalla datasets). When there are high de-
pendencies between the real locations (i.e., TaxiCab data with
location reports every 5 minutes), PEB-LPPMs perform worse
than optimal Markov designs because they cannot capture
these correlations. This could be addressed in future work by
developing PEB-LPPMs based on blank-slate Markov models.
These PEB-LPPMs would re-estimate the Markov transition
matrix on-the-fly using released locations and taking road
restrictions into account.
On another note, in this work we use the average ad-
versary error to measure privacy, since it is probably the
most used metric in related works [1]–[5], [7], [9], [13],
[18]. However, there are other alternatives, such as geo-
indistinguishability [2], [8], [12], [18], [23] or the conditional
entropy [1], [9], that quantify different notions of privacy. We
now discuss why PEB-LPPMs also improve in terms of these
metrics.
Throughout our evaluation (Figs. 9-11) we have seen that,
in many scenarios, PEB-LPPMs outperform hardwired-based
LPPMs. The underlying reason of this improvement is that
the mobility profile that PEB-LPPMs estimate a-posteriori
characterizes the actual user mobility better than the hardwired
models. Thus, we can expect that PEB-LPPMs will also
outperform hardwired LPPMs in these scenarios in terms of
other privacy metrics, since they are more tailored to the
actual user behavior in the testing data (e.g., PEB-Exp will
provide more geo-indistinguishability or conditional entropy
than SP-Exp for the same quality loss, in a sporadic location
release scenario).
VIII. RELATED WORK
Early surveys of location privacy attacks, defenses and
privacy metrics, by Decker [24] and Krumm [25], do not
include any discussion about modeling user mobility.
A first explicit modeling appears in [1], where Shokri et al.
propose a framework to evaluate location privacy mechanisms.
In their framework instantiation, they consider a Markov
hardwired model for user mobility, and in their evaluation
they effectively merge training and testing sets. A number of
follow-ups also hardwire the mobility model using the evalua-
tion data itself. In sporadic location privacy, this methodology
was used to design and evaluate LPPMs according to different
privacy notions. First, it was used to find optimal LPPMs
in terms of the average adversary error, either by reporting
individual locations [5], using dummy check-ins [6], or in
combination with geo-ind guarantees [17]. Second, hardwired
user mobility models are used to obtain utility improvements
and derive optimal geo-indistinguishability LPPMs [2], or to
evaluate a semantic variation of this notion [3]. Non-sporadic
location privacy works also hardwired their mobility models
on the evaluation data, and typically adopt a Markov model
for user mobility to account for temporal correlations [4], [7].
Chatzikokolakis et al. are the first to explicitly separate data
used to design LPPMs and to evaluate them [8], in the context
of geo-indistinguishability. However, they do not quantify
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Fig. 10: Experiment MK: Performance of PEB-LPPMs versus MK-LPPM in Brightkite and Gowalla datasets. MK-LPPM have
been trained with the rich data.
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Fig. 11: Experiment MK: Performance of PEB-LPPMs versus
MK-LPPM in TaxiCab dataset, with one day of training.
MK-LPPM have been trained with the scarce data (a single-day
trace).
the privacy gap between theoretical design and empirical
evaluation in a testing set.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to
evaluate previous optimal LPPMs by considering a separation
between training and testing data. We find out that LPPMs
perform worse than previously reported results [5], [7], [9],
[13] when empirically evaluated in a testing set. We also
propose a blank-slate model for user mobility, which allows us
to design LPPMs that learn the model parameters during the
evaluation. We are not aware of other blank-slate models in the
literature, although the mobility profile estimation carried by
PEB-LPPMs is similar to the problem of estimating a distri-
bution from noisy data in privacy-preserving data mining [21].
IX. CONCLUSIONS
Previous strategies to design Location Privacy-Preserving
Mechanisms (LPPMs) assume that training data can com-
pletely characterize user mobility behavior, and hardwire this
information in the mechanism itself. We demonstrate how this
design decision overestimates the privacy offered by these
designs when the users’ mobility profile deviates from the
training set characteristics.
We propose to use blank-slate models for user mobility that
treat the mobility profile as an unknown variable that has to be
learned. We leverage a sporadic blank-slate model to propose
a new family of defense techniques, PEB-LPPMs, that adapt to
the user behavior using past obfuscated queries. We compare
our proposal to hardwired LPPMs, and show that PEB-LPPMs
improve the privacy except in continuous location release
scenarios where user locations are highly correlated.
The problem identified in this paper is not unique to the
location privacy domain. More generally, to build privacy
enhancing technologies that provide strong privacy guarantees
in real cases, we have to embrace that training information
cannot always fully capture real user behavior. We believe
that blank-slate models, that incorporate the uncertainty about
real user behavior, are a promising approach to improve
the protection provided by privacy mechanisms not only in
location privacy but in a broader type of privacy problems.
APPENDIX
A. Privacy performance of the memoryless LPPM in the
hardwired model of user mobility.
Consider the full-type LPPM f(zr|zr−1,xr), and a
memoryless-type LPPM that we denote by f∗, defined as
f∗(zr|xr) .=
∑
xr−1
∈X r−1
∑
zr−1
∈Zr−1
p(xr−1, zr−1|xr) · f(zr|zr−1,xr) .
(21)
The average loss of f and f∗ is the same, i.e., Q(f, r) =
Q(f∗, r) due to the linearity of this metric. Then, by proving
that f∗ does not achieve less privacy than f , we prove that the
privacy and quality loss trade-off of f∗ is not worse than that
of f . For these proofs, we use p∗ to denote the probabilities
referred to the case where the LPPM used is f∗. Also, we use
z−s .= [z1, z2, · · · , zs−1, zs+1, · · · , zr].
Our goal is to prove that minh PAE(f, h, r, s) ≤
minh PAE(f∗, h, r, s), i.e., that f∗ does not achieve less privacy
than f against an optimal adversary that minimizes PAE:
min
h
PAE(f, h, r, s)
=
∑
zr∈Zr
min
xˆs
[ ∑
xs∈X
pi(xs)p(zr|xs)dP (xs, xˆs)
]
(a)
≤
∑
zs∈Z
min
xˆs
 ∑
z−s
∈Z−s
∑
xs∈X
pi(xs)p(zr|xs)dP (xs, xˆs)

=
∑
zs∈Z
min
xˆs
[ ∑
xs∈X
pi(xs)p(zs|xs)dP (xs, xˆs)
]
=
∑
zs∈Z
min
xˆs
[ ∑
xs∈X
pi(xs)f∗(zs|xs)dP (xs, xˆs)
]
(b)
=
∑
zr∈Zr
min
xˆs
[ ∑
xs∈X
pi(xs)p(z−s)f∗(zs|xs)dP (xs, xˆs)
]
= min
h
PAE(f∗, r, s) .
Step (a) comes from splitting the summation over zr into two
summations: one over zs and the other over the complement.
Then, computing the summation (over z−s) of the minima
over xˆs is smaller or equal than computing the minimum of
the summation. Step (b) follows from the fact that z−s is
independent of zs and xs in the hardwired model and with a
memoryless LPPM f∗.
B. Convergence of the EM sequence to the MLE of the
mobility profile.
We prove the convergence of the EM iteration in (19) to
the maximum likelihood estimator of the mobility profile,
for memoryless and output-based LPPMs only. Let P be the
probability simplex, i.e., the set of valid mobility profiles
P .= {pi|∑|X |i=1 pii = 0, pii ≥ 0}. Then, the MLE is
pˆirML = argmax
pi∈P
log p(zr|pi) . (22)
In [21], [26], authors show that if the likelihood function
(i.e., log p(zr|pi)) has a unique global maximum over P and
the derivatives ∂Q(pi, pit)/∂pi are continuous over pi and pit,
then any EM sequence {pi0, pi1, pi2, · · · } computed as in (19)
converges to the unique global maximum pˆirML. We now prove
that our problem meets these requirements, and refer to [21],
[26] for the complete details of the proof.
First, we prove that log p(zr|pi) is strictly concave and has
a unique global maximum over P . By definition, it is easy to
see that P is convex, i.e., given two profiles pi, pi′ ∈ P , we can
check that pi′′ .= λpi+(1−λ)pi′ ∈ P for λ ∈ [0, 1]. On the other
hand, we can write log p(zr|pi) = ∑rs=1 log p(zs|zs−1, pi) and
show that
p(zs|zs−1, pi) =
|X |∑
i=1
f(zs|zs−1, xs = xi) · pii , (23)
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Fig. 12: Experiment MK: Performance of MK-Exp and
MK-LH against the optimal Markov attack in Taxicab dataset,
when the LPPMs are trained with data from other users.
where f(zs|zs−1, xs = xi) is given by the LPPM (it does
not require pi for its computation, since it is an output-based
LPPM). This means that p(zs|zs−1, pi) is linear with pi, and
therefore log p(zs|zs−1, pi) is strictly concave. This implies
that log p(zr|pi) is also strictly concave, since it is the sum
of strictly concave functions. Since P is a convex set, then
log p(zr|pi) has a unique global maximum over P .
On the other hand, it is easy to see that the derivatives
∂Q(pi, pit)/∂pi are continuous in pi and pit (note that pii ∈
[0, 1]), which concludes the proof.
The proof for memoryless LPPMs is the same, since they
are a sub-type of output-based LPPMs. This result is not
true, however, for full-type LPPMs, since p(zs|zs−1, xs = xi)
depends on the mobility profile (through all the other inputs).
C. Experiment MK: training with data from other users.
We repeat the Experiment MK described in Sect. V-B, but
we train each user’s LPPM using past days of a different user.
Fig. 12 shows the results of these experiments. Here, scarce
training and rich training refer to the case where we train
the LPPM of each user with the past day or the past seven
days of a different user. The performance of MK-Exp and
MK-LH is slightly worse than in Fig. 8, i.e., the LPPMs achieve
less privacy for the same quality loss, but it is nonetheless
very similar. This supports our hypothesis that road restrictions
(and not personal user preferences) are the main source of
correlation between locations in this dataset.
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